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I.  Introduction:  Overview and Scope of Work
The purpose of this brief analysis is to consider the potential points of
contact between a program of "green support" and the existing commodity
programs in U.S. agriculture.  These points of contact may take the form of
conflict, complementarity, or neutrality.  We shall assume initially that
green support is "added" to the programs as they exist in 1994.  Five main
commodity program areas are considered:
A. Deficiency payments resulting from the loan rate/target price
structure
B. Acreage reduction programs (ARPs) operating in conjunction with A.
C. Conservation compliance, sodbuster and swampbuster programs
D. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Wetland Reserve Program
(WRP)
E. GATT obligations and "planting flexibility" as a form of decoupling
The analysis has four main parts.  First, the concept of "incentive
compatibility" is explored as the basis of the analysis to follow.  Second,
the five main program areas noted above are considered in terms of their
compatibility with a program of green support.  Third is a discussion of what
changes in the five program areas would make them more compatible with green
support.  Finally consideration is given to how the green support program
itself might be designed.
Throughout, a basic familiarity with the commodity program areas under
discussion is assumed.  While cursory descriptions of each area are provided,
this study is too brief to be filled with the details of the commodity
programs themselves.  In addition, certain general assumptions are made
concerning the nature of the green support programs.  It is assumed that these
programs will function mainly as positive incentives, or "carrots," rather
than negative incentives, or "sticks" (see Runge, 1994).  That is, they will
reward farmers for behavior which either (a) mitigates existing environmental￿
damages; or (b) improves environmental management from a current baseline. 
These rewards can be divided into two general categories:
￿  Cost-sharing, including grants, soft loans and direct "green"
payments, for a variety of mitigation and/or improvement
efforts, including tree-planting, terracing, and changes in
crop rotations, among many other examples.  These have their
primary impact at the "intensive" margin.
￿  Paid environmental set-asides such as the U.S. Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) and Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), either
expanded or altered from the current basis.  These have
their primary impact at the "extensive" margin.
When examined in this light, it is clear that programs already exist which
fall into the general category of green support.  However, the continuation of
a variety of "sticks," notably penalties for non-compliance with conservation
requirements, remains critical to this analysis, since it establishes a
threshold beyond which environmental damages will not be tolerated.  We now
consider the potential role of green support programs at an expanded level, in




II.  What is Incentive Compatibility?
If green support is added to the existing mix of farm programs, "this
layering of existing and green programs could result in an incentive structure
which either is mutually reinforcing, is at cross-purposes or is non-
overlapping" (Lynch, 1994).  A formal approach to this mix, generally
attributed in large part to Hurwicz (1972), is known as "incentive
compatibility."  In this paper, we shall adopt a simplified version of this
approach originally described by Schelling (1960), in which incentive
compatibility is positive, negative, mixed, or neutral.
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In describing these distinctions, Schelling used the example of Sherlock
Holmes and his opposite Moriarity, in which Holmes and Moriarity were
traveling aboard separate trains, let us say between Oxford and London.  Four
combinations of incentives are possible.  In one, Holmes and Moriarity each
benefit most if they get off at the same station.  This is a positive sum
situation in which their incentives are to coordinate their behavior.  The
second situation is one in which they each benefit most if they get off at
different stations.  This is a negative sum situation in which their
incentives conflict.  Third are situations in which both Holmes and Moriarity
seek to get off at the same station, but the station Holmes prefers is
different from that which is most preferred by Moriarity (e.g., Reading versus
Basingstoke).  This is described as a game of "mixed motives," in which their
incentives are partially but not entirely aligned.  For completeness, it
should be noted that a fourth situation may exist in which either Holmes or
Moriarity, or both, are entirely indifferent respecting the opposite's action.
Let "Holmes" stand for the commodity programs and "Moriarity" for green
support.  The first case corresponds to the notion that certain commodity and
green support programs would motivate farmers in ways that are mutually
reinforcing.  The second is one of incentives that are wholly at cross-￿
purposes.  The third situation is also partially one of cross-purposes, but in
which gains are still possible from some coordination.  The fourth case is one
of non-overlapping, or neutral, incentives.  In the discussion to follow, we
shall adopt these distinctions, together with a conventional nomenclature for
positive, negative, mixed and neutral effects, as shown in Figure 1.  These
effects indicate the direction of incentives for environmental improvement
from the commodity programs as they affect programs of green support.
Figure 1.
(Commodity Programs, Green Support Programs)
1. Pure Positive Incentives (+, +)
2. Pure Negative Incentives (%, %)
3. Mixed Incentives (+, %) (%, +)
4. Neutral Incentives (+, 0) (%, 0) (0, +) (0, %)
(0, 0)
As Figure 1 shows, these four situations generate two "pure" forms of
coordination and conflict.  The third case, of mixed incentives, can be
positive for commodity programs, while negative for green support, or vice
versa.  The fourth case generates five possibilities:  positive/neutral,
negative/neutral, neutral/negative, neutral/positive, and neutral/neutral.  In
all, nine possible relationships exist.
A last preliminary comment concerns the direction of causality or
effect.  In general, because of their size and influence, we assume that the
commodity programs dominate green support.  However, it is possible that in
time green support will actually drive the decision of farmers to participate
in the programs we shall review below.      This study does not explicitly cover the incentive effects
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of a wide variety of federal marketing orders for fruits and
vegetables, although the policy prescriptions in the conclusion
could apply to many lands devoted to such uses.
￿
III.  Commodity Programs/Green Support
A.  Deficiency Payments:  Loan Rates and Target Prices
The loan rate and target price, together with market prices, jointly
determine the limits of the deficiency payment paid to farmers who elect to
participate in the price support programs offered for many field crops,
notably corn, wheat, oats, barley, cotton, and rice (for a discussion see
Cochrane and Runge, 1992, Chapter 3).  This scheme of price support truncates
the distribution describing possible price fluctuations for crops, assuring
farmers of the market price or loan rate (whichever is higher), plus a
deficiency payment equal to the difference between the market price (or loan
rate) and the target price, multiplied times an average yield-per-acre figure
and the number of "base" acres for a given crop on a given farm.  In return
for this price protection and risk reduction, farmers are required in certain
years (depending on USDA determination in a given year) to set aside, through
the acreage reduction program (ARP) and occasionally through paid-diversions,
a proportion of this "base."  In 1990, an additional "flex-acres" requirement
of 15 percent of base was added, on which no deficiency payments are made (see
Figure 2).
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The primary consequence of this arrangement is to encourage farmers to
grow the program crops so supported, and thus to build and retain "base."  In
the 1980s, as much as 95 percent of program crop acreage was enrolled in the
federal commodity programs (National Research Council, 1989).  Complying base
acreage as a percent of program crops ranged from 43.6 percent in 1982 to
106.4 percent in 1987.  These percentages have fallen slightly in the 1990s,
in part because the yields on which deficiency payments are calculated￿￿
have been frozen, and in part because of the "flex-acres" mandated for program
participants (see Section E).  But risk reduction continues to make these
programs attractive, and thus encourages farmers to forego other crops, or to
alter rotations, in order to secure this protection.
The environmental impacts of these programs are not the main focus of
this analysis; it is the incentives compatibility between them and green
supports.  However, numerous empirical studies strongly suggest that high
deficiency payments distort incentives in ways which run counter to the
rewards contemplated under green supports, ecnouraging monocultures, reducing
planting flexibility, and increasing intensity to boost yields (Young and
Painter, 1990; Dobbs, et al., 1988; Lyman, et al, 1989).  For example, Just,
et al. (1991), simulated the impacts of deficiency payments for wheat and corn
on irrigation and groundwater depletion in the Ogallala Aquifer.  The study
also estimated impacts of acreage diversions (see B. below).  It concluded:
We show that increases in target prices and price supports produce
sizeable increases in the adoption of irrigation and therefore
groundwater depletion.  Interestingly, high price supports coupled
with more stringent diversion requirements increase irrigation and
groundwater depletion substantially in as short a time as 5 years. 
This finding bears out quantitatively previous conjectures that
efforts at supply control give farmers a strong incentive to
increase yields by intensifying cultivation (p. 231).
Now imagine that green supports -- such as cost-sharing, direct
payments, or paid set-asides -- were available at attractive enough levels to
encourage farmers to engage in agronomically more sound rotations, or to
reduce production intensity by limiting irrigated acreage.  How do such green
supports interact with the deficiency payment?  In effect, the deficiency
payment raises the ante required in order for green supports to represent an
attractive alternative.  While farmers might well desire to engage in such
environmentally sound practices with green support, they still would benefit
more from retaining base and restricting rotations by seeking the shelter of
the commodity programs.
The situation is thus one of mixed motives, in which farmers are
attracted to alternatives with green support, but in which traditional￿
deficiency payments, and the commitment to certain cropping patterns they
engender, remain even more attractive.  If green supports were "layered" on
top of deficiency payments (as they are, in effect, now), deficiency payments
raise the amount of green support necessary to induce a change in behavior. 




EXISTING PROGRAMS Incentive Compatibility
A. Deficiency Payments (+, %)
B. Acreage Reduction Programs (ARPs) (+, +) (if targeted to
high pollution-to-output
land)
(+, %) (if targeted to low
pollution-to-output land)
(+, 0) (if untargeted)
C. Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster 
and Swampbuster Programs
￿ As currently structured (+, %) (due to A. above)
￿ If penalties decoupled from A. and B. (+, +)
D. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) 
and Wetlands Reserve Program
￿ As currently structured (+, %) or (+, 0) (due to
supply control target
[same as B.])
￿ If retargeted to high pollution-to- (+, +) (same as B.)
output land
E. GATT Obligations and Planting Flexibility (+, +)
as a form of "Decoupling"￿￿
B.  Acreage Reduction Programs (ARPs)
The next program area involves the set-asides required on a year-to-year
basis in return for participation in the commodity programs.  These acreage
reductions are designed to reduce the amount of budget exposure for federal
commodity program outlays and to reduce surpluses.
Because the amount of acreage reduction is determined by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) annually prior to planting, it is difficult
to guess how much the supply control "brake" should be applied in the face of
the "accelerator" of both market and government price signals.  Moreover,
farmers regularly retire acres of lowest productivity, leading to substantial
"slippage" in the amount of production actually reduced through mandated
acreage reduction.  Over time, income support programs also have increased the
amount of investment in added capacity, contributing to growing problems of
surpluses.  Roberts, et al. (1989) concluded that the "brakes" approximately
offset the "accelerator," so that "the production reducing effects of the
acreage reduction arrangements approximately offset the short term production
stimulating effects of the deficiency payments."
In effect, the ARPs shift production from the extensive to the intensive
margin.  As Antle and Just (1991) show at a theoretical level, the
environmental impact of such production control depends on whether the land
taken out of production has a higher or lower pollution-to-output ratio than
the land remaining in production.  Since it is rational for farmers to divert
lower productivity acres, the question is the joint distribution of
productivity and vulnerability to erosion or other pollution-creating
characteristics (see Heimlich, 1989; Taff and Runge, 1988; Rausser, et al.,
1984).
In general, however, ARPs are difficult to target to high pollution-to-
output acres compared with longer term set-asides.  Osborn (1993) and Heimlich
and Osborn (1993) show that in practice, ARPs have failed to establish
adequate vegetative cover and are constantly shifted from one location to
another, failing to provide any consistent impact on erosion control.￿￿
If ARPs (or other diversions, such as the Conservation and Wetlands
Reserve Programs considered in D. below) are targeted to land highly
vulnerable to erosion or with other high pollution-to-output ratios, then they
will be more consistent with green supports also designated to reduce such
pollution events (+, +).  Unfortunately, ARPs and other diversions have been
oriented in substantial part toward production control, implying a preference
for higher output lands and thus lower pollution-to-output ratios.  The result
is to raise the intensity of production on lands remaining in crops and to
aggravate pollution events, operating partially at cross-purposes (+, %). 
Since ARPs are also shifted from one location to another, and vary in extent
from year to year, and are thus untargeted to envirnomenbtal goals at present,
they are at best random in their pollution-to-output effects.  The result
would presumably be neutral with respect to green support (+, 0).
C.  Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster and Swampbuster Programs
Three main conservation programs were implemented as part of the 1985
farm bill and reauthorized in 1990, which make receipt of federal agricultural
subsidies conditional on adherence to certain environmental management
practices.  These three programs are known as conservation compliance,
swampbuster and sodbuster requirements, and represent the main "sticks" or
negative incentives used to induce environmentally responsible farm-level
behavior.
When originally devised in the 1985 farm bill, these penalties were set
in terms of the loss of all future farm program payments, as well as
eligibility for federal crop insurance and other USDA benefits.  In 1990, this
so-called "drop dead" penalty was adjusted so that local ASCS committees could
impose penalties graduated from $500.00 to $5,000.00, depending on the
severity of the violation.  While this adjustment has helped to reduce the
apparent lack of proportionality between the penalties and the offenses
involved, there are still serious difficulties with these programs.
Conservation compliance requires farmers with fields classified as
highly erodible to develop conservation plans for their farms, and by 1995
requires full implementation of these plans.  Farmers who fail to implement
them potentially face the financial penalties described.  Conservation￿￿
compliance has faced several problems related to general agricultural
subsidies to which it is held hostage, that make it difficult to implement
(Gardner, 1993, pp. 16-17).  In this respect, its incentive effects emerge
directly from the loan rate/target price mechanism described above.
First, high reliance on government deficiency payments (and other
government payments) for net farm income has continued to make farmers and
their elected representatives in Congress view even the adjusted penalties for
noncompliance as excessive.  Enforcement has been problematic, and a variety
of loopholes have been created through legislative and administrative means so
that local committees primarily responsible for enforcement have penalized
relatively few.
The 1990 farm bill language establishing the graduated sanctions
provided additional discretion for USDA to waive ineligibility for program
benefits if the farmer is found to have "acted in good faith and without the
intent to violate the provisions of this subtitle," and/or if the violation is
"technical and minor in nature."  How "intent" is to be shown in such cases is
problematical, as are local interpretations of "technical and minor."
Second, in any case, with higher market prices (and lower deficiency
payments), the incentive to undercut conservation compliance remains, because
when prices are high, conservation is most threatened by the incentive to farm
every available acre.  And when market prices are high, the penalties for
noncompliance appear relatively low.  As the Economic Research Service (ERS)
of USDA noted in a 1990 report:
The effectiveness of the conservation provisions depends upon
the attractiveness of Federal price and income support programs.  If
Federal commodity support programs become less attractive due to such
factors as higher market prices or increased set-aside requirements,
the conservation provisions will become less effective (Young and
Osborn, 1990, p. 31).
Third, conservation groups have also charged that Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) offices have retreated from conservation compliance under
pressure from farmers who claim that its requirements are too strict and its
penalties too severe.  Federal authorities responsible for administering
conservation compliance changed the erosion goal from soil loss tolerance
levels (T-values) required in the basic conservation system (BCS) to￿￿
alternative conservation systems (ACS) which required a "substantial level of
erosion control at reasonable cost."  These levels were interpreted very
differently from state to state as field office technical guides (FOTG) were
developed, and make comparative evaluations of conservation compliance very
difficult (Heimlich, 1994).  Noting weakened standards in the key farm states
of Iowa and Nebraska in April, 1990, the Center for Rural Affairs (1990)
raised the concern that "The SCS is sending a signal to other regions and
states that weaker erosion standards are acceptable."
The "sodbuster" and "swampbuster" provisions suffered from related
problems.  "Sodbuster" is designed to limit the plowing of cropland designated
as highly erosive, and "swampbuster" to limit the conversion of designated
wetlands to croplands.  To do either leads, as in conservation noncompliance,
to the penalties described.  Again, these laws are likely to be undercut
precisely when they are most needed if administrators and legislators view the
penalties involved as excessive.  Like conservation plans, sodbuster and
swampbuster conditions are interpreted and enforced by local committees acting
on behalf of USDA.  At the local level, where the offending farmer is likely
to be well-known to committee members, administering the penalties is
especially difficult.  To date, only a relatively few such penalties have been
handed down, and many have been overturned on appeal.  Cook and Art (1993)
report that as of 1992, 1,953 producers were found in violation of
conservation compliance, sodbuster, and swampbuster requirements, leading to
denial of $10.8 million.  However, $4.6 million was restored on appeal,
leaving a net of $6.2 million in penalties.  This is roughly equal to less
than one-half of one-percent of total commodity program payments in the single
year 1992.  The real issue is whether USDA can and will actively enforce these
laws after 1995, when conservation plans are to be fully implemented.
Estimating the impact of green support layered on top of conservation
compliance, sodbuster and swampbuster is thus complicated by the fact that
they are all a function of the deficiency payments and other programs,￿￿
including CCC loans, FmHA loans, crop insurance, etc., the denial of which
potentially constitutes the penalty for noncompliance.  Hence, reducing or
eliminating the loan rate\target price mechanism or other USDA program
benefits would convert the penalty from what is currently a highly unlikely
event to one with zero consequences.
However, there is no reason in principle why the penalties for
noncompliance should be tied to USDA programs, and there are several reasons
already described why they should not.  Many farmers do not participate in
these programs, and fewer are likely to in the future if program benefits fall
before budget cuts.  If all penalties for noncompliance were assessed directly
by an agency outside of USDA, utilizing the graduated structure currently on
the books, like traffic tickets, even clearer signals would be sent to
farmers.  These penalties would be considerably easier to administer and
enforce if responsibility for them were removed from local committees of USDA. 
Once these noncompliance penalties were decoupled from the commodity and other
USDA programs, green support could operate as a complementary "carrot" to the
"stick" they would represent, both driving in the same direction (+, +).￿￿
D.  Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Wetland Reserve Programs (WRP)
In the face of major crop surpluses in the early 1980s and as a result
of new demands from environmental groups, the CRP became part of the Food
Security Act of 1985, and was reauthorized in the 1990 farm bill.  The 1990
farm bill also authorized a Wetland Reserve Program (WRP), which pays farmers
to restore wetlands by offering easements.  The WRP and CRP, as well as the
Water Quality Improvement Program (WQIP), together constitute the
Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program (ECARP).  To date, the WRP
has been capped for budgetary reasons at 50,000 acres in 1993, which was
raised in fiscal year 1994 to 75,000 acres (Gardner, 1993, p. 18).  This
compares with 36.5 million acres currently enrolled in the CRP.  Together the
CRP and WRP constitute the most major effort to date to undertake "green
support."  They are thus worthy of especially detailed analysis of incentive
effects.
The CRP, like its 1956-62 precursor the Soil Bank, pays volunteering
farmers to retire land from field crop production and to plant grasses and/or
trees.  CRP contracts are 10 years.  The original Soil Bank paid farmers to
retire cropland for 3-10 years (10-15 years for trees).  In return farmers
received an annual rental payment and 80 percent cost-sharing to plant cover
crops or trees.  No limits were placed on individual acreage enrollment and
"whole farm" retirement was rewarded with a 10 percent rental bonus.  Where
trees were planted (2.1 million acres) especially in the South of the U.S.,
nearly 90 percent remained planted to trees in 1976 (Alig, 1980).  However,
much of the rest of the Soil Bank, especially in the Midwest, was returned to
field crops in the 1970s and 1980s.
As CRP contracts begin to expire in 1996, a question arises:  will the
CRP, like the Soil Bank, simply end up as a temporary measure to remove land
from production?  Or can the incentive to protect vulnerable lands be retained
through a revised program of green support?  The answer to these questions
requires disentangling the two primary objectives of the CRP:  surplus crop￿￿
reduction and environmental protection.  These two objectives have confounded
the incentives of the program from the outset, and have different implications
for a layering-over of green support payments.
From the outset, the CRP has attempted to do two things at once:  reduce
surpluses and protect highly erodible lands.  Like conservation compliance,
sodbuster and swampbuster provisions, the CRP has been affected by motivations
tied less to conservation than to the farm subsidy programs.  It was thus in
large part justified as an addition to the Acreage Reduction Program in
controlling crop surpluses.  This has created serious incentive problems.
First, the opportunity cost of the 10-year contract is set by the market
price of the commodities which could be grown on CRP acres, and thus is
related to deficiency payments, which fall with rising market prices.  When
market prices were weak and deficiency payments high (as in the 1985-86 period
when the CRP began), the program looked relatively "cheap" to USDA relative to
direct paid land diversions.  However, in order to attract farmers into the
program, rental payments had to be competitive with target prices on base
acres.  As a result, USDA had to pay rental rates well-above market rents in
most areas of the country in order to induce enrollment (in some cases 200-300
percent higher) and even offered bonuses for corn base acres.
These bonuses reflected a second major problem:  because the CRP was
understood as a mechanism for supply control, the lands targeted for
retirement gave explicit priority to reducing cropland acres, rather than to
the most environmentally vulnerable lands, which might include pasture,
forestland or wetlands with no cropping history.  Specifically, farm base
acreage (defining eligibility for crop subsidies) was reduced when land was
enrolled in the CRP according to the ratio between acreage put in the CRP and
total acreage for "program crops" on the farm.  For example, if a farmer had a
200-acre farm (all of which were "crop acres") and a 100-acre corn base, and
put 50 acres into the CRP, the ratio of CRP acreage to total cropland was
50/200, or 1:4, and corn base was reduced by 25 percent, or from 100 to 75 see￿￿
Cochrane and Runge, 1993, Chapter 3).
The result of this "base bite" was to further increase the reservation
rent which the government was required to pay to induce farmers into the
program.  The CRP will cost about 19.2 billion dollars between fiscal years
1987 and 2003.  A 1989 GAO report found that it could have been much less
costly and more effective, and that USDA was focusing mainly on getting acres
into the CRP, rather than on fulfilling its environmental objectives (GAO,
1989).  Despite some broadening of program design, a 1993 GAO report
concluded:
CRP is an expensive way to reduce the environmental problems
linked to agricultural production.  The program will require
budget outlays of about $19 billion to take 36.5 million acres out
of production; however, not much is known about the dollar value
of the environmental benefits purchased or about the extent to
which removing the land from production will alleviate
environmental problems associated with agriculture (GAO, 1993, p.
8).
Finally, as surpluses have dwindled and market prices have risen, both
farmers and the government find the CRP less attractive as a supply control
measure, and the desire to be done with it grows.  Its impact on total acres
in production is significant.  Yet simply eliminating it would do nothing more
than repeat the Soil Bank experience, at considerable cost.  Current policy
discussions in the U.S. are focused on three key issues:
￿ Which lands now under CRP contract should be returned to active
cropping (although still subject to the 1995 conservation plans under
"conservation compliance")?
￿ Which lands now under CRP contract should remain under restrictive
contract, and what form should this contract take?
￿ Which lands not now under CRP contract should come under some form of
additional environmental restrictions?
In order to answer these questions, a targeting distinction needs to be
made between land that is "marginal" from a supply control perspective
(because it is unproductive and has low output) and land that is "marginal"￿￿
from an environmental perspective (because it is vulnerable to erosion damage
or otherwise manifests high pollution potential).  In Figure 4, these two
dimensions, identified as "productivity potential" and "pollution potential"
are described as continuous variables, but are divided into "high" and "low"
categories for purposes of discussion.  The approach shown in Figure 4 has
been applied in a practical setting by the State of Minnesota, in implementing
a state-level set-aside discussed below (see Larson, et al., 1988).￿￿
Figure 4




High Category 2 Category 3
Potential*
Low Category 1 Category 4
*Measurable either as yields per acre on the basis of historical data or in
terms of productivity indices calculated for various soils.
**Pollution potential can be expressed in term of erosion potential, or more
broadly to reflect land parcels subject to groundwater contamination, strips
along protected streams, wetlands, or areas of special value as wildlife
habitat, etc.￿￿
It is apparent that land in Category 1 has a high pollution-to-output ratio,
while land in Category 3 has a low pollution-to-output ratio, and that land in
Category 2 has high pollution and high output, making the ratio uncertain but
clearly intermediate to Categories 1 and 3.
Category 1:  Low productivity/High vulnerability land
Land in this category has limited potential for supply control, but is
highly vulnerable to pollution.  It is thus land which, if currently enrolled,
should remain in the CRP or under some form of restrictive easement,
preferably on a permanent basis.  Land not currently in the CRP, but falling
in this category, should also be targeted for permanent retirement from
cropping through land-use restrictions, including conservation compliance,
sodbuster or swampbuster.  Because its productivity is low, the opportunity
cost of its removal from cropping is also low.  Hence payments to farmers to
retire it or not to crop it should also be relatively low.
Category 2:  High productivity/High vulnerability land
Land in this category has high productivity potential, but is also
highly vulnerable to environmental damages from pollution.  If it is currently
in the CRP, it should remain so, protected by a restrictive easement which
will require a higher price paid to participating landowners than Category 1
lands.  There may be reason not to seek permanent easements, simply because on
a short-term basis, its productivity might be needed.  If it is not currently
in the CRP, then efforts should be made to designate it through conservation
compliance criteria, restricting cropping in most cases.  Some additional CRP
contracts might be offered where needed.
Category 3:  High productivity/Low vulnerability land
Some land in the CRP already falls in this category.  In these cases,
current CRP contracts should be allowed to expire, and only limited land-use
restrictions should be imposed in the future, consistent with conservation
compliance requirements.  Land in this category not currently in the CRP￿￿
should be granted special status as "sustainable cropland," and cropping
practices that maintain its high productivity should be encouraged.
Category 4:  Low productivity/Low vulnerability land
Lands in this category are of relatively limited value for either
agricultural production or environmental conservation.  If they are now in the
CRP, such contracts should simply be allowed to expire.  However, this land
may be especially well-suited for non-agricultural industrial or residential
uses, and land-use restrictions, zoning ordinances, and land-use planning
could all reflect these considerations.
Implementing CRP Targeting Criteria
Categorizing land into such divisions is not especially demanding from
an analytical or official point of view.  The approach is adaptable to local
conditions, so that relative rather than absolute standards could be set for
given geographic areas, while maintaining federal oversight.  Such divisions
could go a long way toward tailoring policies which would 
￿ maximize the environmental benefits of land use restrictions, even
where these benefits are difficult to quantify
￿ reduce budget expenditures for land retirement contracts or easements
￿ release highly productive and relatively non-vulnerable cropland from
the CRP
Apart from the CRP, these categories could also be used to calibrate
penalties for non-compliance with conservation requirements.  If these
penalties were divorced from the commodity and other USDA programs, and paid
like traffic tickets, enforced outside of USDA, penalties would be highest on
Category 2 lands, followed by Categories 1, 3 and 4.
Suppose now that funds are available for green support to continue some
form of modified CRP.  This discussion offers some targeting guidelines for
green support, which follow along the same lines as the discussion of ARPs in
Section B. (see Figure 3).      Steps in this general direction are already occurring.  As
3
a result of 1990 FACTA, USDA changed CRP bid evaluation
procedures to screen all bids against productivity-adjusted
dryland cash rent.  Thus, bids that are higher than the county
average dryland cash rent, adjusted up or down based on the ratio
of the county average to the soil-specific yield of a reference
crop, are rejected.  Bids that pass this rent screen are then
ranked according to an environmental benefits index (EBI) per
dollar of rent asked and the best land chosen.  Thus, cheaper
land with lower benefits may be competitive with more expensive
land that has high environmental benefits.  However,
environmental benefits cannot be quantified in dollar terms,
although the rent screening and EBI ranking are an improvement
over procedures used for the first 9 CRP signups (Heimlich,
1994).
￿￿
￿ Land which is highly productive but not vulnerable to environmental
pollution (low pollution-to-output ratios) should be allowed to
produce on a sustainable basis largely free of restrictions on
cropping practices.
￿ Land which is highly vulnerable to environmental pollution, whether
productive or not, should be subject to strict conservation
standards, compliance requirements and should be retired on a
permanent basis if low in productivity, and on a time-limited
contract if higher in productivity.
￿ Penalties for violations of conservation requirements should be
adjusted to be proportional to damages, and enforced by an agency
other than USDA.
￿ Payments for land retirement on either a permanent or time-limited
basis should reflect the productivity of the land, with lower
payments for lower productivity lands.
3
In sum, as currently structured, the CRP operates very much like the
supply control mechanism of the ARP, and fails to maximize environmental
benefits.  By encouraging intensive cultivation of non-CRP acres, and focusing
excessively on supply control, it has failed to target high pollution-to-
output lands.  Such retargeting would shift much of the CRP from the (+, -) or
(+, 0) to the (+, +) incentive category.￿￿
E.  GATT Obligations and Planting Flexibility as a Form of "Decoupling"
The 1990 farm bill mandated that 15 percent of "base" acres for the
program crops be treated as flexible acres, on which farmers were free to
plant other crops (subject to certain restrictions) in return for which they
would forego deficiency payments.  These "flex acres" were a remnant of a
larger 1990 proposal to make the entire base flexible, also known as Normal
Crop Acreage (NCA).  The 15 percent "flex acres" in the 1990 farm bill
represented an incremental step toward "decoupling" commodity price supports
from specific crop bases.  The NCA concept would move even more dramatically
toward such decoupling.  In the context of the now-completed GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations, decoupled approaches have been
given additional impetus, since it is generally acknowledged that decoupled
supports are less trade distorting.
Various empirical analyses have supported the idea that greater planting
flexibility would reduce the force of the "vise grip" described in connection
with the commodity program in Section A.  Young and Painter (1990), in their
case study of the Palouse Region, found that if an NCA had been in place in
1986-90, rather than the 1985 farm bill provisions, "the NCA would have been
markedly more effective in sheltering the base of a farmer using the
environmentally sustainable perpetrating alternative legume system (PALS)
rotation" (p. 13).  In a 1991 world Resources Institute study, based on micro-
level analysis of representative farms, Faeth, et al., argued that decoupling
farm subsidy payments would provide greater environmental benefits than a
variety of alternative policies.  The authors concluded:
Multilateral decoupling provides the greatest net economic
value of the policies we tested.  The simple fact that income
support is not tied to commodity production allows market signals
to reach farmers, encouraging them to use their resources in ways
that are inherently more efficient.  In areas with high resource
costs, farmers who take a long view would likely shift to
resource-conserving rotations, while in regions with low resource
costs, farmers would shift to less chemical-intensive methods (p.
20).
More recently, Feinerman, et al. (1993) at the Center for Agricultural￿￿
and Rural Development (CARD) simulated the effect of planting flexibility in
the face of tightening environmental regulations, specifically a ban and a tax
on the use of corn root worm herbicide.  They concluded that such "Base
flexibility relaxes a constraint for producer behavior... [and] can be tied to
a ban or a partial ban on corn rootworm insecticides as a way of compensating
farmers for associated income loss" (p. 14).  Referring specifically to the
incentive effects of planting flexibility and environmental improvements, they
noted that "flexibility in commodity policy is important to the maintenance of
farm income for producers that must comply with restrictive environmental
policies" (p. 2).  Moreover, because of the interdependencies between
commodity and environmental policies, greater planting flexibility offers
"opportunities for win-win or near win-win outcomes from more coordinated
policy actions" (p. 3).
If green support were added to this mix, it thus would be highly
complementary to planting flexibility, and could even be used as a primary
mechanism to substitute decoupled green support for deficiency payments tied
to base (+, +).￿￿
IV.  Changes in Existing Programs to Increase Compatibility with Green Support
The analysis above leads to three clear implications concerning existing
programs.  Each of the changes identified below would increase compatibility
with green support.
￿  Deficiency payments should continue to be eliminated in favor of
flexible acres.  In place of these payments direct decoupled
support should substitute for commodity-specific price
guarantees; however, these payments can be "greened" by
recoupling them to various environmental objectives.
￿  Acreage Reduction Programs (ARPs), as well as the CRP and WRP, can
all be made more compatible with green support by targeting
them to high pollution-to-output ratio lands.  ARPs would
continue to apply to crop acreage bases, but CRP and WRP
would be broader in scope.
￿  Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster and Swampbuster requirements
should be decoupled from the commodity programs and applied
to all farmland, whether it is in or out of the farm
programs, including pasture and lands without cropping
histories.  Graduated penalties for non-compliance would
then be applied based on the severity of the problem and the
size of the land parcel involved by an agency outside USDA,
using the same criteria applied to target the ARP, CRP and
WRP.
Each of these proposed changes arises directly from the lack of incentive
compatibility discussed above.  However, it is most useful to think of these
changes as a package, and to envision how current programs might begin to
shift in the direction of green compatibility over time, utilizing the billion
dollars or more currently devoted to conservation in more effective ways.
The 1990 farm bill provisions for 15 percent flexibility represented a
step in the direction of decoupling, which has been documented to improve the￿￿
capacity of farmers to respond to environmental regulation (Feinerman, et al.,
1993), and to alter rotation practices in a resource-conserving way (Young and
Painter, 1990; Faeth, et al., 1991).  However, continuing to increase the
proportion of "flex-acres" in relation to total base also reduces the income
security represented by deficiency payments.  It is therefore unlikely that
additions to flex-acres to, say, 30-50 percent from the current level of 15
percent would be feasible without some form of additional revenue or income
assurance.  However, a fixed payment per acre could be offered in lieu of
deficiency payments, essentially along the lines of the 0-92 provisions of the
1990 farm bill.  This payment could be constant, but preferably would
fluctuate inversely with farmers' terms of trade (prices received versus
prices paid) (see Cochrane and Runge, 1992).
As will be described in detail below, these payments could be "greened"
by graduating them to reflect advanced soil-conservation methods such as no-
till, the use of alternative crop rotations, extensive livestock/cropping,
integrated pest management, wetlands rehabilitation, diversified forest
plantings, and a wide range of other approved practices reflecting local
priorities for sustainable agricultural development.  A specific scenario for
this type of green support will be illustrated in the next section.
Increases in planting flexibility to levels of 30-50 percent (or even to
100 percent, as under Normal Crop Acreage) do not imply that the U.S.
Department of Agriculture would need to abandon the Acreage Reduction Program
(ARP) as an instrument of policy.  ARPs in the form of some planting
restrictions could continue to apply either to the complement of base not in
flex-acres (e.g., 20 percent ARP on 50 percent of corn base not treated as
flex-acres, equal to 10 percent), or even to Normal Crop Acres (e.g., no more
than 90 percent of NCAs to be planted to corn).  Whether ARPs would be any
more effective under these circumstances than currently in restraining
production is an important question, but is outside the scope of this study.
What is most germane to the issue of green support, however, is that
acreage set-asides with environmental aims, especially a revised CRP and WRP,￿￿
respond primarily to environmental objectives rather than serving as programs
of supply control.  The simplest way to assure that they do is to continue the
trend toward explicitly targeting high pollution-to-output acres, and
graduating payments for conservation set-asides such as the CRP and WRP to
reflect the opportunity cost in productivity of removing these environmentally
vulnerable lands from production and engaging in approved conservation
management practices.  Such payments would then become an additional green
support option for landowners, whether they were participating in the flex-
acres/deficiency payment scheme or not.
Finally, conservation compliance, sodbuster and swampbuster would
continue to apply to all farmland, independent of participation in the above
programs.  The result would be to pose a choice to the landowner:  be liable
for these requirements without compensation in the form of green support, or
get on board (for example, by signing up for a CRP or WRP contract) and engage
in management practices which receive green support as well.  In effect, the
requirements of conservation compliance, sodbuster and swampbuster would
establish a baseline, or threshold, below which penalties would apply,
graduated to reflect the severity of the infraction.  Management practices
above this threshold, representing "affirmative action," would become eligible
for green support.￿￿
V.  Designing Green Support Programs
The three elements of the policy reform package described in the
previous section also provide the basis for designing a green support program. 
The program would be composed of three parts, two "carrots" and one set of
"sticks."
￿  Increased participation (whether voluntary or mandatory) in flex-
acres would be compensated with decoupled payments; these
payments could be "greened" by graduating them to reflect a
wide array of locally-developed sustainable practices, with
local and federal priorities determining the level of green
compensation.
￿  Acreage set-asides (ARPs, CRP, WRP) would be targeted to high
pollution-to-output acres, with compensation (in the case of
CRP and WRP) graduated to reflect productivity differences. 
Such payments would constitute the second main form of green
support, and could also be varied depending on landowner
willingness to engage in locally and federally approved
conservation management alternatives.
￿  Conservation Compliance, Sodbuster and Swampbuster requirements would
be expanded to include all federally designated lands,
whether or not enrolled in federal farm programs.  Penalties
for violations would be graduated to reflect the severity of
the infraction and the acreage involved, and would be
entirely divorced from the commodity programs.  These
requirements would set minimum acceptable management
practices.
As in the reform of existing programs, the design of green support
should be thought of as a package.  The expansion of flex-acres, independently
of green payments, should increase the ability of farmers to respond to
environmental objectives.  By substituting decoupled support for deficiency￿￿
payments, and graduating and "greening" this support to reflect local and
federal conservation priorities, trade-distorting subsidies are eliminated at
the same time that environmental needs are targeted.  Decoupling is thus
accompanied by "recoupling" to environmental objectives.  Conservation acreage
set-asides would be the second main option for landowners.  Finally, stringent
and more widely applied requirements for conservation compliance, sodbuster
and swampbuster would create a stick for noncompliance.
An Example
Consider a 400 acre corn-soybean farm in the Mississippi Valley with 300
acres of corn base and 100 acres enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program,
with a CRP contract terminating in 1997.  Under the proposed reforms,
mandatory "flex-acres" under the 1990 farm bill equaling 45 (300 X .15) might
be expanded to 90 (300 X .30), to a total of 30 percent.  In addition
"optional flex-acres" could be offered, with decoupled compensation, up to 50
percent of total base.  If the farmer had been receiving a deficiency payment
of $1.00 per acre and had yields frozen at 100 bushels, then his loss in
revenue from the mandatory expanded flex-acres would be 
($100.00 X 45 = $4,500.00).  
This income foregone due to increased flexibility would be combined with the
prospect of loss of CRP revenues beginning in 1997-98.  Suppose that a per-
acre payment of $75.00 under the CRP, equal to $7,500.00 a year, would be
lost.  Then the losses of flex-acre expansion from 15 to 30 percent
($4,500.00) combined with the annual CRP loss ($7,500.00), would represent a
$11,500.00 reduction in revenues.
Now suppose that decoupled payments are paid on the mandatory 15 percent
increase in flex-acres, equal to 50 percent of the foregone income, or
$2,250.00.  In addition, optional flex-acres are reimbursed at 90 percent of
foregone income.  If the farmer enrolled a total of 50 percent of base in such
flex-acres (an additional 20 percent or 60 acres) at 90 percent of the
previous payment, he would receive $5,400.00.  Finally, suppose that decoupled￿￿
"green payments" were made on all of the mandatory flex-acres (90 acres) plus
the voluntary flex-acres (60 acres), equal to 150 acres, in return for an
expanded rotation including oats and some fallow in what had previously been a
strict corn/soybean rotation.  This approved rotation would receive an
additional .20 cents per acre per year assuming 100 bushel yields, equal to
$3,000.00.
On net, the farmer would reduce his income due to mandatory flex-acres
by $2,250.00, and due to voluntary flex-acres by $400.00, but would receive an
additional $3,000.00 in green payments, leaving him with a net gain of
$340.00.  The consequence of the flex-acre addition applied to all corn base
would probably be to reduce excess supplies, making an ARP less likely,
although it could still be applied to the remaining 50 percent of base.
Now suppose that a new CRP contract is offered at 75 percent of the
previous bid price (in this case $75.00) for high pollution-to-output
designated acres with this farm's productivity potential, and that acres not
so designated could be returned to base.  Of the 100 acres in the CRP, 50
percent are determined eligible for a continuing contract or easement, equal
to a continuing revenue stream of 
50 X (.75 X $75.00) = $2,812.50.
Since 50 acres are returned to base, the calculations above would need to be
redone. If the same percentages applied, then total base would be 300 + 50 =
350, of which 15 percent would be uncompensated flex-acres, a mandatory
additional 15 percent would be compensated at 50 percent, and 20 percent
voluntary flex-acres would be compensated at 90 percent.  In addition, green
payments on all of the flex acres would be paid at .20 cents per acre, and a
CRP contract on the remaining 50 eligible acres would pay 75 percent of the
previous bid price, or $56.25.
In sum, the effect of the green payments would be as below.
￿Total new base = 350 acres
& Total eligible for CRP = 50 acres
￿Existing mandatory flex-acres = 15 percent = 52.5 acres￿￿
￿Additional mandatory flex-acres = 15 percent = 52.5 acres
@ .50 cents per acre X 100 bushels/acre = $2,625.00
￿Voluntary flex-acres = 20 percent = 70 acres
@ .90 cents per acre X 100 bushels/acre = $6,300.00
￿Green payments on all flex-acres = 50 percent = 175 acres
@ .20 cents per acre X 100 bushels/acre = $3,500.00
￿CRP payments on 50 acres @ 75 percent of $75.00 = ($56.25 X 50) =
$2,812.50
￿Continued Deficiency Payment on 175 acres @ $1.00 per acre 
X 100 bushels/acre = $17,500.00
￿Total Decoupled Income Assurance on Flex-Acres $8,925.00
￿Total Green Payments ............. 3,500.00
￿Total CRP Payments on New Contract ...... 2,812.50
_________
￿ TOTAL PAYMENTS .............. $32,737.50￿￿
It should be noted that this compares to an assumed status quo payment of
￿Total base = 300 acres
￿Total in CRP = 100 acres
￿Existing mandatory flex-acres = 15 percent = 45 acres
￿Deficiency Payment = (300 acres - 45 flex-acres) 
X $1.00 per acre X 100 bushels/acre = $25,500.00
￿CRP Payment = (100 acres X $75.00 per acre)  . 7,500.00
_________
................ $33,000.00
In short, the proposed reforms in this hypothetical example are
essentially budget neutral.  Reductions in support due to additional planting
flexibility and CRP retrenchment are offset by green payments.  What has
changed, in a major way, are the incentives linking farm income support
programs and environmental improvements.￿￿
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